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Results-based financing can mean different things to dif-
ferent people. There are no commonly agreed-upon defini-
tions and international agencies use various terms to refer 
to similar concepts or instruments. For example, the De-
partment for International Development (DFID)1 distin-
guishes between results-based aid (RBA) and results-based 
financing (RBF) according to their funding source and the 
contracting arrangements. 
For the purpose of this working paper, all of these instru-
ments are referred to as RBF. This paper distinguishes be-
tween those instruments that are used at macro level—that 
is, the contract is between a donor and a government or 
subnational entity—and instruments used at a micro 
level—that is, either channeling financing on the supply 
side or on the demand side (through, for example, a private 
operator, an NGO, or a household). 
Table 1 gives an overview of the range of instruments that 
are potentially applicable to the sanitation sector. 
 
Results-Based Financing (RBF) refers to a broad family of 
financial instruments. With RBF, public funding is pro-
vided only if pre-specified results have been achieved. Its 
use in the sanitation sector has so far been limited, as op-
posed to in other sectors such as health or education. 
This working paper aims to identify practical ideas for 
advancing the use of innovative financing mechanisms 
focused on results and performance, with a view to sup-
porting the delivery of sustainable sanitation services. To 
this end, we review: 
• The rationale for examining RBF instruments for 
sanitation; 
• Current issues with sanitation, where “misaligned 
incentives” mean that inadequate services are being 
provided or demanded; 
• How public funding, if allocated based on results, 
could help with realigning incentives; and
• Common issues and challenges with the design of 
RBF instruments. 
Introduction
1 DFID is a donor that has been leading the way with respect to the development and promotion and results-based financing instruments.
TABLE 1: POTENTIAL RESULTS-BASED FINANCING INSTRUMENTS APPLICABLE TO SANITATION
Level Potential Results-Based Financing (RBF) Instruments 
Macro level National level: Cash on delivery (COD) aid 
Local level: Rewards to communities or local governments, performance-based interfiscal transfers
Supply-side Output-based aid: Support for incumbent operator or small-scale providers 
Advanced market commitments (AMC) for research and innovation
Demand-side Conditional cash transfers to households 
Targeted subsidies, voucher schemes 
Individual rewards 
Research and support Results-based research grants
Awards and international competitions 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on Pearson 2011 and interview with Paolo Craviolatti, DFID.
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The case for allocating public funding to support the development and sustain-
able provision of sanitation services is strong. Sanitation is a basic service with 
substantial positive impacts on both health and the environment, which in turn 
generates benefits for the economy as a whole. 
Yet traditional financing for sanitation is not very effective and is typically 
insufficient. 
There is typically a lack of clarity about which sanitation sector actors should 
be financed and how. This is often due to the following issues: 
• Fragmented responsibilities for sector supervision; 
• Fragmented responsibilities for service delivery;
• Weak operators (both financially and operationally); and
• Lack of financing channels for traditional funders (such as international 
donors or governments) to transfer funding en masse to those who need it 
most, such as households or small-scale entrepreneurs.
This is coupled with a lack of clarity on what available funds should be used 
for, due to the following commonly encountered issues: 
• In many countries, funds have traditionally been spent on hardware sub-
sidies that can result in “wasted” investments. This is changing, with an 
increased emphasis on software spending, but the efficiency of these soft-
ware “investments” has yet to be adequately tracked.
• Funds are often misallocated throughout the sanitation value chain, with 
“too much” funding allocated to sewers and wastewater treatment rather 
than to improving basic access, for example.
• Funds are usually provided on an “input basis,” meaning that that there are 
limited incentives to reduce the costs of providing services.
• Although households are supposed to be the main investors in on-site san-
itation, they get limited public support for their investment. 
As a result, financing allocated to the sector has so far been limited. This is in 
part because the sanitation sector needs to demonstrate the effectiveness of how 
it uses the funds. If used effectively, public funds could help leverage additional 
Results-Based Financing 
for Sanitation: Making 
the Case
I. KEY POINTS• Traditional financing has not been sufficient in advancing sanitation goals. 
• A key assumption in using RBF for sanitation is that 
public financing can help realign incentives in sanitation 
markets and foster more efficient and equitable service 
delivery.
• A second assumption is that payments for performance 
can foster improved and more cost-efficient service 
delivery and better pro-poor targeting.
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Results-Based Financing for Sanitation    Making the Case
financing from other sources, such as households themselves (with or without 
microfinance), small-scale private sector, or other sources of public and donor 
funding.
A key assumption underlying the consideration of RBF for sanitation is that pub-
lic financing (subsidies) can be used to realign incentives in sanitation markets 
and foster more efficient and equitable service delivery. A related assumption is 
that payments for performance can foster improved and more cost-efficient ser-
vice delivery as well as better pro-poor targeting. These two assumptions underlie 
the arguments made in this document. They would need to be tested as RBF 
initiatives for sanitation develop and it becomes possible to evaluate the perfor-
mance of RBF instruments versus more traditional approaches to financing. 
If used effectively, public funds could 
help leverage additional financing from 
other sources, such as households 
(with or without microfinance), small-
scale private sector, or other sources of 
public and donor funding. 
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resource allocation at that level. The main issue affecting 
the sanitation sector as a whole is the lack of prioritiza-
tion, especially when compared with other basic services, 
such as health, education, and even water. This may be due 
to a number of factors, including: 
• Fragmented responsibilities due to the “owner-
ship” of sanitation having been transferred to the 
At present, the sanitation sector is riddled with “misaligned” 
incentives (or market failures) that have limited investment 
flows to the sector. This section briefly reviews where incen-
tives are misaligned across the sanitation value chain (see 
Figure 1).
First, incentives are misaligned at the level of the overall 
sanitation sector. This is the root cause for insufficient 
Identifying Misaligned 
Incentives in the 
Sanitation Sector 
II. KEY POINTS• Market failures can occur at all levels of the sanitation value chain (demand creation, collection, transport, 
treatment, disposal, and reuse) on both the supply and 
the demand side.
• Realignment of incentives can take place along all steps 
of the sanitation value chain.
• RBF instruments can help remedy insufficient resource 
allocation for sanitation due to lack of prioritization.
FIGURE 1: TYPES OF SANITATION SERVICES ALONGSIDE THE VALUE CHAIN
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entry point for sanitation provision.2 It consists of building 
and operating infrastructure to collect sanitation products, 
including human excreta, black water (septage), or grey 
water (sullage). Collecting the waste can be done via onsite 
sanitation solutions (for example, dry pit latrines or septic 
tanks) or off-site systems, where excreta are removed from 
the plot, most commonly via waterborne sewerage. 
A number of market failures may appear both on the de-
mand and on the supply side of that segment, which means 
that provision of collection services (infrastructure building 
as well as operation and maintenance) may be insufficient 
compared to what would be socially optimal. Table 2 lists 
examples of such market failures.
Transport. Transport can be carried out in two ways. For on-
site sanitation systems, when such systems fill up, the sludge 
needs to be emptied and transported to a sanitary landfill. 
For off-site sanitation, transport is done via the sewers. How-
ever, most latrines belonging to the world’s poor are not con-
nected to a sewer system. When latrines fill up, they need to 
be moved or emptied. In most rapidly growing cities, empty-
ing is poorly organized and regulated. Householders either 
empty pits and tanks themselves or pay private operators to 
do so. Waste is often dumped in the nearby environment, 
especially (as is often the case) if there is no official disposal 
and treatment point, or if it is far away. Pit and tank waste is 
heavy and costly to transport, and operators often incur addi-
tional costs because they have to pay to dump the waste at an 
official site. The result is that little on-site waste reaches the 
treatment plant and most ends up in nearby watercourses, 
waste ground, or unofficial landfill sites. 
municipal government, which seldom has the drive, 
the competence, and the financial resources to tackle 
such issues;
• Competition with other sectors, such as the health 
sector, which have become more sophisticated at 
“making the case” for attracting investments; 
• Lack of awareness of the impacts that poor sanita-
tion can have on public health, the environment, 
and the rest of the economy via related sectors (such 
as tourism, agriculture, or fisheries); and
• The taboo element, which can result in difficulties in 
generating political gains from tackling sanitation. 
Such a lack of prioritization may be felt at either the na-
tional or local government level, depending on how respon-
sibilities for sanitation have been allocated to various levels 
of government. The two may be linked, as local govern-
ments often get a substantial share of their funding through 
transfers from the national government. 
A potential way to address such lack of prioritization at 
the level of policy-makers using RBF instruments would 
involve using COD (Cash on Delivery) Aid contracts at the 
national level or community or local government rewards at 
the local level (see the subsection “Macro Level: Modifying 
Policymakers’ Incentives” in Chapter III).
Incentives can also be misaligned at each step of the sanita-
tion value chain, as discussed below. 
Collection. This step of the value chain, also referred to as 
capture and storage, is generally considered to be the main 
TABLE 2: EXAMPLES OF MARKET FAILURES LEADING TO INSUFFICIENT COLLECTION SERVICES 
Demand-Side Failures Supply-Side Failures
No or insufficient demand for sanitation 
Lack of awareness about the benefits of sanitation 
Entrenched behavior or resistance to change 
Not affordable 
No financing available for up-front investment
No or insufficient providers (such as masons)
Existing providers do not have adequate / sufficient equipment 
Existing providers have  insufficient training 
Existing providers have no legal status and operate illegally
Utilities have monopoly rights and do not allow  additional 
providers 
2 In Figure 1, an intermediary step, “demand creation,” was inserted because several activities may need to be carried out by other actors to generate demand independently of 
investments into collection.
8311-CH02.pdf   4 10/20/11   12:22 PM
Results-Based Financing for Sanitation    Identifying Misaligned Incentives in the Sanitation Sector 
www.wsp.org 5
Treatment. Treatment can take place either on-site (some on-site systems allow 
on-site treatment, such as septic tanks, but only if they are adequately main-
tained) or off-site (when the waste has been collected via sewer networks or pit 
latrine emptiers and transported to a sewage treatment plant). Treatment of these 
waste flows is often critical to protect downstream water resources, public health, 
and the environment. 
Table 3 lists some examples of potential failures on the demand and supply sides 
of waste transport and treatment. 
Safe disposal. Safe disposal requires isolating the residual waste from human 
beings and from the environment (for example, to protect water resources). This 
can be achieved by building safe disposal sites, which are lined (thereby protecting 
groundwater resources) and set aside from human settlements. Such safe disposal 
sites might not exist in sufficient numbers, however, or might be inappropriately 
built or out of reach for enterprises transporting the waste. For example, if the 
sites are on the outskirts of town and charge a fee for disposal, it may not be eco-
nomic for pit latrine emptiers to dispose of the waste at those sites. 
Reuse. Suitable treatment can result in waste streams being converted into a valu-
able resource for reuse. Reuse of treated excreta offers significant benefits both in 
terms of reducing the need to find safe disposal sites for waste and because the 
waste itself contains nutrients that are an important resource for agriculture or 
energy generation, either at a large scale (wastewater treatment plants with co-
generation) or at the domestic/community level through biogas plants.
Table 4 lists some failures that can occur at the reuse step of the sanitation value 
chain. 
“Addressing” these market failures can be done through a range of policy instru-
ments, including developing and enforcing regulations, applying penalties and 
standards, or making incentive payments. 
TABLE 3: EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL FAILURES IN WASTE TRANSPORT AND TREATMENT
Demand-Side Failures Supply-Side Failures
Unwillingness to pay for the service (especially when 
“no-cost” alternatives, such as dumping the waste on 
the street, are available)
Existing services are not affordable
Limited entry into the segment
Under-investment by both small-scale entrepreneurs and 
utilities 
Appropriate technical solutions are not available (lack of 
innovation, partly due to lack of market entry)
Limited returns create difficulties for firms to grow
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RBF consists of using public funds to make incentive payments to address such 
market failures. RBF can be used at various levels: at the macro level to influence 
policymakers to prioritize sanitation sector investments, or at the micro level, 
either on the supply side or the demand side of the various steps of the sanitation 
value chain. 
Results-based financing consists of 
using public funds to make incentive 
payments to address market failures.
TABLE 4: EXAMPLES OF POTENTIAL FAILURES IN WASTE REUSE
Demand-Side Failures Supply-Side Failures
Local culture may be “opposed” or resistant to reuse of 
grey waters
By-products from reuse cannot compete with alternative 
products (for example, subsidized energy or chemical 
fertilizers) 
Sludge has limited financial value when its economic value 
could be large (if markets for reuse were better organized)
Higher costs of reuse facilities 
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Public funds can be used at several levels to realign incentives to provide sustain-
able sanitation, at the macro level or at the micro level (on the supply or on the 
demand side). This chapter examines the main RBF instruments that have been 
promoted over the years in several sectors (including, for example, health, edu-
cation, and energy) and assesses whether they are applicable to sanitation. Each 
instrument is introduced and then discussed in terms of its application to the 
sanitation sector. 
Macro Level: Modifying Policymakers’ Incentives 
As mentioned in Chapter I, policy-makers at the national and local levels might 
be under-prioritizing the sanitation sector. RBF can be used to generate incen-
tives for policy-makers to act differently, either at the national level (for example, 
through COD Aid) or at the local level (for example, through rewards for local 
governments or communities).
Using Cash on Delivery (COD) Aid: A Contract Between an External Donor 
and National Governments
What is COD Aid? COD transfers funds, typically to the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF), in proportion to progress toward a mutually agreed outcome such as 
universal primary education completion or reductions in illness. It is presented 
as a way to create incentives for “the government to address a problem of its own 
making.”
COD Aid is results-based in the sense that transfers only take place if the goals 
have been met and progress has been independently verified. The approach lets 
the recipient choose how such mutually agreed objectives will be achieved. For 
example, if universal primary education completion is best achieved by building 
roads (so children can get to schools) rather than building schools or training 
teachers, the MoF can allocate funds for that purpose. The recipient can make a 
specific request for additional technical assistance but this is by no means an in-
tegral (and mandatory) part of the aid package. COD Aid, as a concept, was first 
introduced by US-based Center for Global Development (CGD).
Several donor agencies have expressed interest in incorporating this type of aid 
into the design of their programs. For example, DFID is in the process of nego-
tiating a COD Aid arrangement with the Government of Ethiopia to support 
RBF can be used to generate 
incentives for national- and local-level 
policy-makers to act differently. 
Cash on delivery (COD) transfers only 
take place if specified goals have been 
met and independent verification of 
progress has taken place.
Using RBF to Realign 
Incentives in the 
Sanitation Sector 
III. KEY POINTS• At the macro level, RBF instruments such as cash on delivery (COD) aid or community rewards can generate 
incentives for policy-makers to act differently.
• RBF instruments targeted to suppliers to incentivize them 
to provide services to the poor include output-based aid 
(OBA) and advanced market commitments (AMC).
• On the demand side, RBF can generate incentives for 
households to change their behavior through conditional 
cash transfers (CCTs) and vouchers.
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At an international level, COD Aid for sanitation could 
take the form of a contract between a donor and the Minis-
try of Finance in a given country, with a fixed remuneration 
(to be agreed) per unit of achievement. In line with the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),4 achievement 
could be defined based on coverage, with a unit payment 
per person with access to improved sanitation according to 
the Joint Monitoring Programme (JMP) definition.5,6 
To encourage sustained coverage, it would be preferable 
to pay a lower unitary amount for the entire achievement 
rather than focus exclusively on new coverage. This would 
also be more in line with current performance verification 
systems (that is, JMP) that track overall coverage rather than 
new coverage. Indeed, particularly with respect to on-site 
sanitation, some households that had access to improved 
sanitation may lose it in the following year (for example, if a 
latrine collapses due to flooding or because it becomes full); 
focusing on new coverage may therefore be inadequate. 
Although an emphasis on coverage is in line with existing 
performance verification mechanisms, the debate on post-
MDG indicators has shown that focusing on coverage alone 
is often not sufficient and may in fact generate perverse in-
centives. For example, on-site latrines may exist but they 
have filled up and are therefore unusable. The latrines may 
secondary education for girls. In this example, pre-agreed 
unit payments would be made for each girl who passes sec-
ondary school tests. 
A note by Robert Kaplan3 for CGD explored three alterna-
tive arrangements to apply COD Aid to the water sector, al-
though it did not address the sanitation sector (see Table 5).
This note indicated that to achieve sustainable improve-
ments, a COD Aid contract for water should last at least 
five years, preferably with automatic extensions after five to 
10 years. It was envisaged that depending on the baseline 
coverage, the COD Aid payment be made on the whole 
extent to which the indicator has been achieved (especially 
when the baseline is very low, with a view to pay for past 
achievements) or only for a given increment above a speci-
fied baseline. 
How could it be applied to the sanitation sector? COD 
Aid could be appropriate for the sanitation sector in order 
to modify governments’ current attitudes toward the sector. 
A critical issue would be to define an indicator that provides 
incentives for governments to invest in a sustainable and 
measurable manner, without creating particularly burden-
some performance monitoring requirements or generating 
perverse incentives. 
3 Kaplan 2010
4 See http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg
5 See www.wssinfo.org/definitions-methods/introduction
6 This may be open to discussion, however, as many countries track sanitation coverage differently from what the JMP does: it would therefore be necessary to specify the 
monitoring strategy in advance in the contract.
TABLE 5: POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF COD AID TO THE WATER SECTOR 
Alternatives for Annual Payments Output Definition Verification Issues Identified 
Per satisfied household (HH) served HH with access meeting WHO 
standards 
Household surveys How to determine household 
satisfaction 
Water quality standards 
Per volume of water billed and paid Water billed and paid  Operators’ audits Bias toward formal operators
Possible perverse incentive to use 
more water
Per satisfied household served, ad-
justed by percent billed and paid of 
total volume of water produced
As above, combined Household surveys 
+ operators’ audits 
Higher verification burden 
Source: Kaplan 2010
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be emptied periodically, but in an unhygienic way that gen-
erates environmental and public health hazards. 
Complementing a coverage indicator with a volumetric in-
dicator (as Kaplan suggests in his note for the water sector) 
may be possible. This could be done in several ways, such as 
by measuring the volume of sludge either disposed of at safe 
disposal points or treated to adequate standards. Measuring 
performance in this way would be more difficult in terms 
of performance verification for sanitation than for the water 
sector, however, for the following reasons: 
• In less-developed countries, the bulk of the volume 
that needs to be safely disposed of (and treated, 
where applicable) tends to originate from on-site la-
trines. These volumes are not currently tracked in 
most performance verification systems. 
• Residual volumes are highly dependent on the 
method used for collecting excreta. For example, if 
water-borne sewerage is used, the volumes of sew-
age are much higher than if using dry-pit latrines. 
Tracking such volumes in a consistent and compara-
ble manner could therefore prove methodologically 
challenging.
7 Trémolet et al. 2010
BOX 1: THE NIRMAL GRAM PURASKAR IN INDIA 
The Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP) is a national program in which the central government that provides one-off 
monetary rewards to qualifying Gram Panchayats (local governments). Payments are based on a set of criteria 
(which include, among others, 100 percent sanitation coverage of individual households and being totally free 
from open defecation) and are made following a verification process. These rewards range between US$1,250-
12,500 per Gram Panchayat, depending on the population. Gram Panchayats can use the cash incentive to im-
prove and maintain sanitation facilities in their respective areas with a focus on solid and liquid waste disposal 
and maintenance of sanitation standards. In addition, the State of Maharashtra has introduced several state-
based campaigns, such as the Clean Village campaign (Sant Gadge Baba), which takes place annually and allows 
for maintaining overall cleanliness in the villages and strengthening the performance verification mechanisms. A 
key limitation of the program in India is related to the weakness of the performance verification systems, however, 
which appeared to be prone to some manipulation, particularly in certain states. 
Source: Trémolet et al. 2010
Rewards for Local Governments and Communities
Because the sanitation sector is often highly decentral-
ized, providing incentives to local governments to focus on 
sanitation may also be necessary, in complement or as an 
alternative to COD Aid. Such local-government or com-
munity-level rewards were introduced in India in the con-
text of the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC) through the 
Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP) (see Box 1).7
If combined with external funding, a system of “cascading” 
incentives and rewards could be instituted, whereby the 
national government reallocates rewards from a COD Aid 
contract to well-performing villages and communities. 
This kind of village- or community-level incentive program 
could be established by national governments, with inter-
governmental transfers based on clearly defined targets to 
promote sanitation. The type of indicators discussed for 
COD Aid contracts could be used in the context of such 
programs. 
Supply Side: Incentivizing Service Providers
On the supply side of sanitation markets, RBF can be 
used to generate incentives for service providers to provide 
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services to the poor, either because the latter cannot afford the full cost of the ser-
vices or because service providers are not currently serving this market segment. 
This section reviews two main types of RBF instruments that can be used on the 
supply side, including output-based aid (OBA) and advanced market commitments 
(AMC). 
Output-Based Aid (OBA): Incentivizing Service Providers to Serve 
the Poor 8
What is output-based aid? OBA ties the disbursement of public funding (in 
the form of subsidies) to the achievement of clearly specified results that directly 
support improved access to basic services. OBA has gradually emerged as an im-
portant way to finance access to basic services as well as infrastructure provision 
in a range of sectors, including roads, energy, telecommunications, health, and 
education.9
The full amount of subsidy is paid to the service provider (private, public, or 
community operators) only when results have been met and verified by a third 
party. Subsidies are provided ex-post, once the outputs have been delivered over a 
certain period of time, which means that the service provider bears some financ-
ing and performance risk. This encourages the use of private sector funds (lever-
age), which are usually needed to pre-finance a large portion of the costs. 
The need for subsidy is assessed on the basis of the level of demand for the ser-
vice, costs, and social benefits generated. Subsidies are provided to encourage 
the provision of basic services to poor households in a targeted manner: a funda-
mental purpose is to encourage service providers to deliver services in areas that 
are not necessarily commercially attractive or where they would not naturally get 
involved without the subsidy.
How could OBA be applied to the sanitation sector? The use of OBA has so 
far been relatively limited in the sanitation sector, especially when compared to 
other sectors such as water or energy. The Global Partnership for Output Based 
Aid10 has initiated a number of sanitation projects. Only two of them have been 
implemented so far (see Boxes 2 and 3 for existing sanitation projects that have 
received GPOBA’s support), while others have been considered but are yet to be 
implemented or approved. 
In addition, a few national governments have also adopted output-based ap-
proaches to delivering subsidies for sanitation, such as the Government of Mo-
zambique in the late 1980s, Brazil, and India. 
Output-based aid ties the 
disbursement of public funding to the 
achievement of clearly specified results 
that directly support improved access 
to basic services. 
8 This section draws heavily from Trémolet and Evans 2010. Please refer to the full publication for details.
9 For more information on output-based aid and how it has been applied in several sectors, please refer to Mumssen et al. 2010.
10 See www.gpoba.org
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Most OBA projects so far have focused on providing subsidies per new access point 
(either for connection to the sewerage system in Morocco or for on-site sanitation 
as in Senegal). In a paper commissioned by GPOBA and WSP, Trémolet and Evans 
(2010) argued that OBA mechanisms could be used to finance a much broader 
range of activities, going from demand promotion (or more generally “software” ac-
tivities) all the way to sludge reuse and safe disposal. The types of OBA mechanisms 
recommended in this paper are summarized in Table 6 and Figure 2. 
The design of individual OBA schemes will depend on the most appropriate way 
to package the provision of sustainable sanitation services, which means that each 
OBA scheme will likely include a combination of several types of results-based 
subsidies. In addition, the management of human excreta may need to be pack-
aged with that of other waste streams, such as solid waste, for example, if latrines 
or drainage pipes keep filling up with rubbish. OBA subsidies could be provided 
in an integrated manner to encourage the formation of integrated solid waste and 
liquid waste entrepreneurs. 
The main focus of any intervention will be determined by identifying which 
funding gaps need to be filled—that is, where market failures or affordability 
constraints mean that a sanitation service is being under-provided. For example, 
if networked sewerage exists but people are not connected, the principle focus for 
OBA subsidies should be on collection/access (building sewerage connections). 
If households have onsite facilities (such as basic latrines), but the pit waste is 
being indiscriminately dumped in the environment, the focus may be on foster-
ing transport and safe disposal of this waste. 
BOX 2: OUTPUT-BASED AID FOR CONNECTIONS TO WATER AND SEWERAGE 
IN UNPLANNED URBAN SETTLEMENTS IN MOROCCO 
In Morocco, GPOBA provided a US$7 million grant to three service providers (two private operators and one pub-
lic) to extend water and sewerage services into unplanned urban settlements that were formerly excluded from 
regular service provision. Launched in 2007, the project aimed to connect 11,300 households to piped water and 
sewerage. The output was a simultaneous connection to piped water and sewerage for poor households. The 
subsidy was paid in two installments: 60 percent on completion of the connection and 40 percent upon verifica-
tion of at least 6 months of sustained service. An independent third party carried out verification. Details of the 
schemes and the costs of the subsidy varied by operator. Unit subsidies for sewerage connections varied from 
US$421 in Casablanca to US$913 in Meknès, due to differing unit costs and differing ability to pay on the part of 
households in different cities. Initial progress under the scheme was slow, largely due to a lack of familiarity with 
this type of scheme, investment delays upstream, and lack of clarity over land tenure. The pace of investment 
substantially picked up in subsequent years, with Amendis in Tangiers having delivered the expected number of 
connections ahead of schedule. The Government of Morocco is now exploring options for scaling up the scheme 
at the national level.
Source: Based on Chauvot de Beauchêne 2009  and personal communication with X. Chauvot de Beauchêne
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The further down the chain the subsidy is provided, the more likely it will be 
possible to implicitly subsidize previous steps of the chain. However, the further 
down the subsidy is provided on the value chain, the more necessary it may be-
come to add performance indicators that strengthen the poverty targeting. Other-
wise, companies may have a stronger incentive to connect rich or large customers 
rather than those who are poor and more difficult to reach, and likely to consume 
and therefore discharge less. For example, in Sri Lanka, GPOBA proposed to cre-
ate incentives for better operation of onsite sanitation by combining a payment 
for operation of onsite systems with a subsidy for rehabilitation and construction 
of new facilities. The objective was to create incentives for contractors to enter the 
market as “sanitation operators” in charge not only of building latrines but also of 
ensuring that they are adequately maintained and remain operational over time. 
As a result, the packaging of sanitation services eligible for a payment could help 
foster the development of new sanitation service providers. For example, the 
The further down the chain the subsidy 
is provided, the more likely it will be 
possible to implicitly subsidize previous 
steps of the chain. However, the further 
down the subsidy is provided on the 
value chain, the more necessary it 
might become to add performance 
indicators that strengthen the poverty 
targeting.
BOX 3: SENEGAL: OUTPUT-BASED AID FOR ON-SITE SANITATION AT THE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL 
In Senegal, GPOBA is providing subsidies for on-site sanitation facilities in poor urban and peri-urban areas 
of Dakar, the capital city. The OBA component was developed in the context of a broader water and sanita-
tion project funded by a group of donors and led by the World Bank, the Senegal Long Term Water Project. The 
OBA component built on an earlier IDA-funded project, PAQPUD (Programme d’Assainissement Autonome des 
Quartiers Périurbains de Dakar), which already involved an OBA approach, and led to the construction of 63,500 
new on-site sanitation facilities in a demand-driven manner, benefiting more than 400,000 people between 2002 
and 2008. The GPOBA project was initially expected to build on PAQPUD and provide access to an additional 
15,100 facilities to households living in the Dakar region (approximately 135,900 expected beneficiaries with 
about nine people per household). Although the project was expected to end in February 2010, it has been ex-
tended to the end of 2011, due to slow implementation. 
After 1.5 years of implementation, the level of completion was relatively low (around 7 percent of the initial objec-
tive) due to a range of reasons, including:
• The economic crisis had significantly affected Senegalese households who faced difficulties paying for im-
proved sanitation among other priorities such as food, schooling, and other essential household expenses.
• The fact that beneficiary households had to pay the full amount of their upfront contribution (about 25 per-
cent of the total cost) before the construction starts appeared to be a major obstacle for most beneficiaries.
Some of the adjustments that were proposed to address these issues include: 
• A stronger involvement of the main micro-finance institution in Senegal to address the difficulties faced by 
beneficiaries to finance their upfront contributions (although this was tried, it did not help to increase the 
effectiveness of the program); and 
• A revised Information Education Communication (IEC), methodology with an upfront effort in terms of 
mass communication, an increased IEC budget, and increased involvement of local governments. 
Source: Communication with Pierre Boulenger, WSP 2010
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TABLE 6: RANGE OF OBA FINANCING MECHANISMS POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE TO SANITATION
Value Chain Service Types
Indicative Outputs (for 
Monitoring and Payments)
Cost Elements That Could Be 
 Partially Covered Ex-post Type of Service 
ProviderCapital Costs Operating Costs
Demand 
creation
“software 
activities”
Sanitation marketing Number of people who 
build/use a latrine follow-
ing demand promotion 
activities 
Staff sala-
ries, transport 
costs, materials 
development 
NGOs, CBOs, local 
governments, min-
istries, sanitation 
entrepreneurs
Social mobilization, 
triggering 
Village/community be-
coming ODF 
Hygiene promotion Number of people adopt-
ing hygienic practices
Product development Volume of sales of new 
products 
Development 
costs
Staff salaries Sanitation entrepre-
neurs, universities, 
engineering firms 
Collection/ 
access 
Build on-site sanitation 
(pit latrines or septic 
tanks)
Village/community be-
coming ODF 
Number of latrines built 
for eligible households
Number of slabs sold to 
eligible households
Construction 
costs
Households (self-
provision), ma-
sons, utilities, local 
government 
Empty latrines or septic 
tanks
Number of latrines 
emptied for eligible 
households
Volume of waste removed
Start-up costs 
(equipment) 
and initial rehab 
of latrines
Running costs 
of equipment, 
fuel, sala-
ries, costs of 
disposal
Households (self-
provision), private 
operators (manual 
or mechanized), 
utilities, local 
government
Build sewer connections Number of new con-
nections to eligible 
households
Construction 
costs 
Utilities
Private contractors
Build and operate com-
munity toilets
Number of eligible users Construction 
costs, land
Running costs Local government, 
utilities, NGOs, 
CBOs
Build and operate public 
toilet facilities 
Number of toilet blocks 
installed in disadvantaged 
areas and meeting acces-
sibility criteria
Construction 
costs, land
Running costs Utilities, NGOs, 
private contractors, 
local governments
(continued)
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Value Chain Service Types
Indicative Outputs (for 
Monitoring and Payments)
Cost Elements That Could Be 
 Partially Covered Ex-post Type of Service 
ProviderCapital Costs Operating Costs
Transport Transport pit waste and 
septage to designated 
discharge point 
Number of latrines 
emptied for eligible 
households
Volume of waste trans-
ported to approved 
location
Start-up invest-
ment costs
Salaries, 
fuel, costs of 
discharge
Utilities, local gov-
ernment, private 
contractors
Build and operate trans-
fer stations 
Number of transfer sta-
tions built and still operat-
ing after a given period 
Volume of septage col-
lected at transfer stations
Construction 
costs, land
Salaries, 
fuel, costs of 
discharge
Utilities, local gov-
ernments, private 
operators
Build and operate sew-
erage systems
Number of eligible house-
holds connected to new 
sewers with satisfactory 
service (can be measured 
by surveys, payment of 
tariffs, etc.)
Construction 
costs
Salaries, 
fuel, costs of 
discharge
Utilities, local gov-
ernment, community 
contractors, private 
contractors
Treatment Build, maintain, and 
operate decentralized 
wastewater treatment 
facilities
Volume of waste collected 
at plant and treated to re-
quired standard
Construction 
costs, land
Salaries, 
fuel, costs of 
discharge
Utilities, local gov-
ernment, community 
contractors, private 
contractors
Build, maintain, and op-
erate principal wastewa-
ter treatment plants
Volume of waste collected 
at the plant and treated to 
required standard
Construction 
costs, land
Salaries, 
fuel, costs of 
discharge
Utilities, local gov-
ernment, community 
contractors, private 
contractors
Safe 
disposal/ 
reuse
Build and maintain eco-
logical toilets or biogas 
facilities
Number of ecological/ 
biogas toilets installed/
used 
Volume of productive agri-
cultural inputs generated
Energy generated
Construction 
costs, land
Local government, 
private contractors, 
communities
Treat waste to standards 
required for reuse and 
deliver it to locations as 
required
Volume (or percent) of 
waste reused
Construction 
costs, land
Salaries, fuel, 
transport costs 
(if required)
Utilities, local gov-
ernment, private 
contractors (large 
schemes)
Local government, 
households, com-
munities (for individ-
ual ecological toilet 
installations)
TABLE 6: CONTINUED
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Programa de Letrinas Melhoradas that ran in Mozambique from the late 1980s 
until recently led to the establishment of local workshops to manufacture and sell 
latrine slabs. Their development was first supported through capacity-building 
activities. Following a sharp increase in production prices that had threatened the 
workshops’ commercial viability, ex-post subsidies based on the sales of latrines 
were introduced in the early 1990s and contributed to the strengthening of their 
activities (such subsidies were later partly eliminated, however, leaving the local 
workshops having to make ends meet from selling bricks or renting out space).11 
If used strategically, output-based subsidies can help trigger broader financing 
reforms in a demonstrative way. A small OBA scheme might not have sufficient 
leverage on the design of broader sector arrangements, and OBA should not pre-
clude the need for greater prioritization of sanitation access through financial 
and regulatory measures at a higher sector reform level. However, the rigor of 
the OBA approach may help in thinking through the sector issues in a more 
If used strategically, output-based 
subsidies can help trigger broader 
financing reforms in a demonstrative 
way.
FIGURE 2: POTENTIAL WAYS OF PACKAGING OBA SUPPORT ALONG THE VALUE CHAIN
Value Chain Examples of OBA “Packaging” along the Value Chain
Demand creation
Collection
M
D
G
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s
Transport
Treatment
Disposal/Reuse
En
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n
m
en
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l F
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s
Promote sanitation, create 
demand, community organization
On-site
with reuse 
Decentralized
treatment facilities 
Reuse sludge
(energy, agriculture) 
Partial on-site
treatment 
On-site
without reuse 
NGP awards (India)
PLM (Mozambique)
PRODES (Brazil)
Gharbeva (Egypt)
Sri Lanka
Payments to pit
latrine emptiers
Payments for reuse
Sewer connections
to off-site network
Treatment
plants
Dispose of sludge into the environment
11 Trémolet et al. 2010
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How could AMCs be applied to the sanitation sector? 
AMCs could be applicable in the sanitation sector where 
there is a strong need for product development (or the de-
velopment of business models) with relatively high devel-
opment costs. In the first instance, this could be done in 
circumstances where the purchaser of sanitation services is 
the public sector, as in the following examples: 
• Software support to sanitation. In countries where 
hardware subsidies have been eliminated or are lim-
ited, the government needs to procure “soft” services 
for demand promotion, hygiene promotion, com-
munity mobilization, and so forth. The government 
could put forward a “competition” for a viable busi-
ness to deliver these services at scale (for example, a 
“franchise” of the Community-Led Total Sanitation 
model) and reward it by giving a guaranteed market 
to these providers (for example, the winner would 
be responsible for triggering all villages in a given 
region and would get paid per village successfully 
triggered).
• “Municipal” sanitation. An AMC could be used to 
support the development of public toilet blocks/
ablution blocks, particularly in dense urban areas 
where they may be the only technical solution. In prac-
tice, this could work as a “design competition,” where 
a large municipality would ask enterprises to come up 
with a viable design and business model for “paying 
public toilets.” The winner would get a guaranteed 
market (in the form of an exclusive service area or a 
license to operate x number of public toilets within a 
city). The municipality would be the buyer of such ser-
vices (with or without external donor support). 
• School sanitation. An AMC could be used to get sani-
tation entrepreneurs to develop a suitable technical 
solution for school sanitation that could then be 
rolled out to x number of state schools within the 
country with domestic or donor financing. 
• Emergency sanitation. An AMC could encourage 
the formation of private groupings (of engineers, 
consultants, universities, and so on) that could re-
spond quickly with adequate sanitation solutions in 
the event of an emergency (such as an earthquake, 
systematic and strategic manner and if successfully imple-
mented, may prove a powerful lever for triggering much 
needed reforms in the sector. 
Advanced Market Commitments (AMC): Incentivizing 
Service Providers to Develop New Products 
What are advance market commitments? AMCs have 
been utilized in the health sector to give incentives for the 
development of vaccines that meet the needs of developing 
countries by guaranteeing a market for those products once 
they have been developed (it could be a price, a quantity, or 
a revenue guarantee). For example, GAVI, the Global Alli-
ance for Vaccination and Immunisation12 has entered into 
an AMC with pharmaceutical companies for the develop-
ment of a pneumococcal vaccine that is suitable to develop-
ing countries. The model could potentially be applied to 
other sectors: there has been some recent discussion about 
how it could be applied to the low-carbon energy sector, for 
example. 
AMCs are to some extent similar to OBA mechanisms, as 
they focus on incentivizing providers. A key difference from 
OBA is that AMCs tend to be used where there is a need for 
new product development and where there is uncertainty as 
to whether a) the product can be effectively developed up to 
the required standard and b) there will be adequate demand 
for the product. Another key difference relates to the fact that 
in AMCs for vaccines the purchaser is the public sector, which 
means that it is easier to “guarantee” a certain price (or quan-
tity or revenue) for the product when it comes to market. 
“Pure” AMCs have been of particular interest in the health 
sector because
• Product development is very expensive and takes 
place over a long period of time; 
• The development of products specific to developing 
countries is only worth investing in if there is a guar-
anteed market; and 
• Governments tend to purchase those goods, as the 
vaccine market is basically funded through 100 per-
cent subsidies in the developing world (with funds 
coming largely from donors). 
12 See www.gavialliance.org
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tsunami, or flooding). As donors need to regularly intervene in emergency 
situations, the AMC would provide a guaranteed market to the consor-
tium for services (and goods) in forthcoming emergencies. 
If AMCs for sanitation were successful in such circumstances, they could then 
be tested in circumstances where the risk is considerably greater for the private 
operator—that is, when householders are purchasers of sanitation services rather 
than the government. However, pre-financing by sanitation entrepreneurs may 
be difficult, especially for product development with a relatively long lead time. 
An appropriate funding vehicle for transferring funding on the supply side would 
also need to be defined. For OBA, GPOBA has so far been providing such a vehicle, 
funding pilot projects with grants in the range of US$2–7 million. However, scaling 
up these instruments will likely require establishing other types of funding channels, 
such as the Honduras OBA facility13 or other similar vehicles being evaluated in the 
Philippines or Kenya. At international level, existing funds could also be relied upon, 
such as GPOBA, the Global Sanitation Fund (GSF)14 or others to be created. 
Demand-Side: Giving Incentives to Households to Change 
Their Behavior 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) 
What are conditional cash transfers? CCTs make welfare payments conditional 
upon the receivers’ actions, usually pre-specified investments in the human capital 
of children. This means that the government only transfers cash to persons who 
meet certain criteria and have adopted certain behaviors. Most CCT programs 
make regular payments to poor mothers if they can prove that their children are 
enrolled in school, get regular check-ups at the doctor’s office, receive vaccina-
tions, or the like. CCT programs have been developed in a growing number of 
countries: virtually every country in Latin America has a program and large-scale 
programs now operate in Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Turkey, with pilot programs 
in Cambodia, Malawi, Morocco, Pakistan, and South Africa.
How could CCTs be applied to the sanitation sector? Although CCTs have 
been applied to finance several social programs (such as health and education), 
they have yet to be used for water and sanitation. A study funded by the Asian 
Development Bank and the Water and Sanitation Program examined the poten-
tial to use CCTs for sanitation financing in rural Cambodia.15
The study found that most CCT nutrition programs target mothers with young 
children, with regular payments made based on records of health and nutrition 
service use. Despite increased awareness of the links between malnutrition and 
diarrhea, few CCT programs include any components that promote improved 
Despite increased awareness of the 
link between malnutrition and diarrhea, 
few conditional cash transfer programs 
include components that promote 
improved sanitation and hygiene.
13 Mandri-Perrott et al. 2009
14  See www.wsscc.org/gsf
15  Robinson 2010
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sanitation and hygiene. Initial discussions suggest that the 
current failure to link sanitation improvement and nutrition 
provides a significant opportunity for improving CCT nu-
trition programs, through the potential for additional condi-
tions that encourage the use of improved sanitation facilities 
and the achievement of collective sanitation outcomes.
The study formulated specific proposals about how to 
use CCTs for sanitation in the Cambodian context, as 
summarized in Box 4. Although these proposals have yet to 
be implemented, a follow-on study is about to be initiated 
to move toward implementation.
Using Vouchers to Support Both the Demand 
and Supply Sides of the Market 
As mentioned in the Cambodia example, vouchers can be 
an effective mechanism for transferring subsidies via the 
demand side to ultimately support the supply-side of the 
BOX 4: PROPOSALS FOR A “GROW-UP-WITH-A-TOILET PLAN” IN CAMBODIA 
Robinson (2010) proposed a plan to ensure that every child in Cambodia “grows up with a toilet” through the pro-
vision of sanitation financing to poor households during the first five years after the first child is born. The inten-
tion is that the development of improved sanitation facilities and the establishment of good sanitation practices 
among both parents and the first-born will ensure that the rest of the family grows up using a hygienic latrine and 
observing good sanitation and hygiene practices. 
The five-year plan would be targeted at poor mothers on the birth of their first child, on the basis that poor chil-
dren under five are the highest risk group for diarrhea, malnutrition, and worms. Assistance would be provided to 
the mother of the household to improve household sanitation throughout the five-year period, with both connec-
tion subsidies (incentives for the construction of facilities) and outcome-based sustainability incentives (to encour-
age long-term improved sanitation practices).
• Year 0 (birth of first child): US$15 toilet voucher (redeemable by local producers) plus a US$5 voucher for 
a rebate on construction of second latrine pit;
• Years 1–5 (annual reward): up to US$10 each year based on following criteria:
• Toilet usage (verified)
• Village toilet coverage (verified)
• Completion of hygiene course
• Presence of handwashing facility
The plan would be supported by demand-creation programs (CLTS, mass media), sanitation marketing programs 
to increase and improve the supply of low-cost sanitation goods and services, and micro-finance programs to en-
able poor households lying just above the “extreme poverty” line to develop improved sanitation facilities. 
The intention of the plan is three-fold: 
• To focus attention on the need to target sanitation finance toward improved sanitation among under-five 
children; 
• To recognize that sanitation finance should promote a process of sanitation development over a period of 
several years (providing incentives for the upgrading of facilities and the adoption of improved behaviors); 
and 
• To encourage more efficient demand-side financing through vouchers and cash transfers in place of exist-
ing mechanisms for the supply of in-kind materials and services. 
Source: Robinson 2010
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market. Vouchers can allow beneficiaries to select service providers based on repu-
tation, price, and preference, rather than being dependent on program-driven 
decisions. This approach can help develop sustainable local supply chains that 
strive to achieve efficiency in the market place.
A fixed value voucher could be linked to a minimum level of sanitation ser-
vice, with provision for some contribution by the household. Eligibility for a 
latrine voucher could be linked to existing means testing systems, with additional 
 criteria—such as households containing children under five—to reduce the num-
ber of beneficiaries where resources are limited. 
An interesting use of vouchers that has been little explored in the sanitation sec-
tor is to provide a voucher for pit-emptying at the same time that a latrine is 
constructed (irrespective of how the latrine is financed, although OBA subsidies 
would be preferable). Such an approach has been proposed in Sri Lanka in the 
context of the design of a scheme to be supported by GPOBA, which aims to sup-
port the development of integrated service providers of on-site sanitation services, 
including latrine construction and downstream operations. 
Combining Various RBF Instruments 
All such RBF instruments have been used in a number of infrastructure or social 
services (such as health and education) but have either been applied at a limited 
scale in the sanitation sector or not at all. 
Each type of instrument has different properties. For example, RBF instruments 
on the supply-side, particularly if they are combined with the introduction of 
competition (via least-cost subsidy bidding systems, for example), can drive down 
the costs of providing the services. RBF instruments on the demand-side, such as 
CCTs, enable households to have better control over how they procure services. 
Interventions on both sides of the market would typically be required, however. 
For example, introducing CCT schemes with sanitation indicators would be of 
limited use if the supply side of the market were not strengthened so as to ensure 
that goods and services get to market. 
Before introducing RBF instruments, it will be essential to evaluate in detail 
where such financing instruments may be applicable and how they may be com-
bined. For example, COD Aid could be used to give incentives to the govern-
ment to experiment with public policies that place emphasis on performance and 
introduce a series of “cascading incentives” and performance targets in the sector. 
Although RBF instruments have shown to increase focus on performance where 
they have been introduced, COD Aid or other “macro RBF instruments” are yet 
to be tested at this stage, which means that it is difficult to assess whether such 
“performance culture” can be introduced in such a way throughout a given sector. 
Voucher systems let beneficiaries 
select service providers based on 
reputation, price, and preference, 
potentially leading to sustainable local 
supply chains that strive to achieve 
efficiency in the marketplace.
8311-CH03.pdf   19 10/20/11   12:22 PM
20 Scaling Up Rural Sanitation
  
A number of challenges have been identified with all RBF 
instruments, and most analysts conclude that great care 
must be taken in their design to achieve higher performance 
than through traditional financing and avoid introducing 
perverse incentives. As Professor Michael Kremer, who first 
conceived AMCs for vaccines, indicated in an interview, 
“complexity should not be shunned because designing ap-
propriate incentives is absolutely essential to the success of 
the scheme and adequate incentives may be complex.”
Key issues for the design of RBF instruments include the 
following:
Define the objectives and evaluate the applicability of 
RBF16: 
• Identify market failures that need to be corrected;
• Evaluate whether other instruments can be used 
to correct such failures (for example, regulatory re-
forms, cost reductions via innovation, and land ten-
ure reforms);
• Evaluate whether sources of subsidy are available and 
whether they could be channeled on an RBF basis. 
If RBF is appropriate, move to the design phase.
Identify which entity needs to be incentivized to deliver 
the objectives (governments, service providers, house-
holds, and so on) 
Evaluate how much risk can be transferred to the entity 
being incentivized. Decisions on optimal risk transfer will 
need to be based on an evaluation of each party’s ability 
to bear (and control) risks and will impact all subsequent 
design decisions (see Box 5). 
Define the payment trigger: 
• Input, output, or outcome? There is a continuum 
of ways in which RBF mechanisms can be designed. 
If the payment trigger is defined in outcome terms 
(for example, a reduction in childhood diarrhea), 
this is transferring a higher degree of risk onto the 
recipient of the subsidy because such outcomes tend 
to be less controllable as they can be influenced by a 
variety of factors. On the other hand, using an out-
come indicator rather than input or output may fos-
ter service providers’ capacity to innovate to deliver 
a given outcome. 
• Performance verification: the payment trigger 
must be verifiable. Performance verification is some-
what more difficult in the sanitation sector than in 
the health or education sectors as latrine usage usu-
ally takes place in the intimacy of one’s house rather 
than in a public building. In addition, using certain 
indicators (such as latrine cleanliness) may introduce 
perverse incentives, if latrines end up not being used 
in order to keep them clean. 
Define the payment amount. This needs to be sufficiently 
high to trigger the expected change in behavior or a decision 
to invest, but not so high that it becomes unaffordable for 
the public budget, nor does the recipient make windfall gains 
out of the subsidy. The benefit level also needs to be set high 
enough to justify the administrative expenditures. A com-
mon way to elicit the optimum payment amount for supply-
side RBF mechanisms while giving incentives to reduce costs 
would be to introduce competition (least-subsidy bidding). 
However, this is most appropriate for RBF on the supply side 
and only where several providers can be mobilized (that is, 
not when there is a dominant incumbent operator).
Designing Results-
Based Financing 
Instruments
IV. KEY POINTS• Before beginning the design of an RBF program, it is necessary to define the program’s objectives and 
determine the applicability of RBF.
• An important aspect of RBF design is determining the 
payment mechanisms (trigger, amount, schedule, and 
so forth).
• Optimal risk allocation involves allocating risks to the 
right degree to those best able to manage and/or 
absorb them.
16 These are only some of the points that would need to be considered in order to evaluate the applicability of RBF mechanisms to a given situation. For a full write-up of the steps 
to be considered prior to considering OBA, for example, see the OBA Diagnostic tool on the GPOBA website (www.gpoba.org/gpoba/diagnostictool).
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example, a rural water and sanitation authority or a local 
government support fund), new entities to be established, 
or a specific account (typically an escrow account). 
Common challenges include the following:
Pre-financing. RBF instruments are based on the prem-
ise that the entity receiving the subsidy has the ability to 
pre-finance (in the case of OBA, for example, the service 
provider would be required to pre-finance the cost of in-
vestment). For some recipients (such as NGOs providing 
community triggering services), this can prove particularly 
Define the payment schedule. For providers that cannot 
pre-finance, it may be preferable to split the payment be-
tween an ex-ante payment and an ex-post payment (see fur-
ther discussion of the pre-financing issue below). 
Define the performance verification mechanisms. These 
can be either based on existing performance verification 
mechanisms or new ones to be established, such as inde-
pendent consultants. 
Define the fund transfer mechanisms. This can be done 
via existing funding facilities at the country level (for 
BOX 5: OPTIMAL RISK TRANSFER IN RESULTS-BASED FINANCING 
The different forms of RBF largely involve creating the right incentives and aligning them with rewards, whether 
this involves recipient governments, the private sector (including NGOs), or both. Part of this may involve optimal 
risk allocation in which certain risks are transferred to these entities. 
The principles of optimal risk allocation involve allocating risks to the right degree to those best able to manage 
and/or absorb them. Optimal risk allocation does not necessarily mean maximum risk transfer. A starting point for 
such risk transfer consists of transferring those risks that are most controllable by the entity to which the risk is 
being transferred.
In the case of transferring risk to the private sector, for example, the starting point is so-called “performance risk.” 
This is the risk involved in delivering the service for which a third party has been engaged—in the sense that if the 
service is not delivered to the agreed level or specification (or in the worst case, not at all), there is a penalty to be 
paid. Such a penalty will typically be financial in nature—at one extreme this may involve no payment at all.
Other risks can be more difficult to transfer to the implementing agents—depending on the context—particularly 
those that are much less controllable. These include other commercial risks, such as market risk, which is com-
posed of demand risk (price and volume) and payment risks (the ability to collect bills from customers) as well as 
other categories of risk, such as financial (exchange rate and interest rate risks) and political risks. 
In developing countries, often a good number of these risks need to be left with governments, as they are bet-
ter placed to manage them, particularly political risks (war, expropriation, currency transfer) where insurance is 
often available to international investors and lenders, if governments stand behind their obligations. Attempting 
to transfer some risks to the private sector will either lead to extremely high-risk premiums being charged, or the 
project being unbankable (that is, finance will not be made available for it). 
In some instances, it may be optimal to share certain risks, for instance market risks. In such situations, the pri-
vate sector may be responsible for an initial degree of risk; thereafter the governments take the remaining risk (or 
upside where events turn out to be better than envisaged).
Source: Mark Cockburn (CEPA)
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challenging. In the State of Bihar, for example, some NGOs that have been pro-
viding sanitation-related services in the context of the Total Sanitation Campaign 
have started withdrawing from the sector as the lag between service provision and 
payment by the TSC is extremely long and does not allow them to be financially 
sustainable. Finally, the need to obtain pre-financing can potentially raise the cost 
of providing the services because the funds that are borrowed to pre-finance the 
service need to be repaid and in some cases can carry a very high interest rate. 
An alternative to this is to place only a proportion of the OBA grant at risk for 
poor performance, such that there would be a lower need for pre-funding. How-
ever, it may be that the previous approach would allow lenders to see that the 
service provider could manage the performance risk and would therefore be more 
willing to provide loans for pre-funding in future.
Potential ways around this problem include:
• Facilitating access to finance as an integral part of the RBF interven-
tion. In the context of an OBA scheme for small-scale water supply provi-
sion in Kenya designed by WSP, the design of the program incorporated 
an agreement with K-Rep Bank, which agreed to pre-finance investments 
by the service providers. The subsidies transferred by GPOBA reduced the 
overall size of the loans to the communities and helped keep debt service 
payments affordable. It also provided better risk management from the 
lenders’ perspective. In that spirit, the providers of RBF funding can seek 
to facilitate access to pre-financing as part of the overall scheme, so as to 
keep the cost of such financing at an acceptable level. 
• Allocating all public funding (subsidies) upfront to an escrow ac-
count, which can then be used as guarantee in order to organize pre-
financing. One common difficulty with RBF mechanisms is the lack of 
predictability of funding for potential recipients. This can be addressed by 
getting donors to allocate all funding in advance and keep such funding 
in an escrow account. If performance has not been achieved, funds are not 
disbursed and then returned to the original funders. 
• Protecting the lender from performance risk on the service provider’s 
part, so as to reduce the cost of pre-financing. If the provider does not 
perform and does not receive the performance payment, it may be unable 
to repay the initial pre-financing, thereby penalizing the lender. To protect 
itself against such performance risk, the lender may have to increase the 
cost of finance substantially. If the performance risk transfer is too high, 
it may be impossible for poorly capitalized entities to raise finance. There 
are, however, options around setting any penalty such that it has a mean-
ingful impact on the service provider, but much less so on the lender. For 
instance, such a penalty might result in a major loss to the provider, but a 
loss of interest, at most, for the lender.
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Performance verification. The success of most RBF schemes hinges on reliable 
performance verification mechanisms. Some government programs that have 
been designed with an RBF framework in mind (such as village-level awards in 
the context of the NGP program in India) have either partly failed or lost their 
credibility because of the weakness of the performance verification mechanisms. 
In existing OBA sanitation programs (such as in Morocco), performance verifica-
tion has been carried out by international reputable experts, who have visited the 
program on a regular basis. This type of performance verification mechanism can 
be used in the context of an internationally funded pilot project but may be dif-
ficult to scale-up, particularly when domestic funds are being used. 
In other programs where RBF principles have been used but insufficient atten-
tion has been paid to independent verification, several problems have emerged, 
such as: 
• Performance verification is done only once, usually too soon after scheme 
completion, which means that sustainability cannot be ensured; 
• Verification is not truly independent: instead, self-reporting is used or an 
agent who has a stake in the process or can be influenced performs the 
verification. This can result in the over-inflation of results. 
A combination of various system of performance verification may therefore need 
to be defined. 
Organizational challenges at the donor level. Some donor organizations may 
have difficulties switching from a traditional “input-based” method of financing 
to an RBF approach largely because of constraints linked to their own inter-
nal procedures. RBF methods are less prescriptive about the means to achieve a 
specified goal, which may run against traditional procurement procedures. At the 
other end of the spectrum, other organizations may have adopted an “outcome” 
focus (such as UNICEF). They may perceive a focus on outputs as a move back 
to focusing on inputs (that is, number of toilets built as opposed to behavior 
change). 
A potential solution is to adopt an RBF approach on a pilot-basis initially, which 
may allow going around existing internal rules and procedures. If a pilot can 
demonstrate the approach’s validity, consideration can be given to scaling it up 
and amending existing procedures. 
The success of most RBF schemes 
hinges on reliable performance 
verification mechanisms.
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RBF instruments appear to have the potential to improve 
the sanitation sector’s focus on results and performance ver-
ification. RBF instruments are relatively new and remain 
largely untested, however, particularly in the sanitation sec-
tor. Going forward, it will therefore be necessary to invest 
great care in their design and to evaluate the costs and ben-
efits of such schemes, particularly when compared to more 
traditional forms of financing. 
For RBF instruments to be increasingly used in the sanita-
tion sector, behavior change at the sector level would also 
be necessary. This could potentially be achieved through a 
number of initiatives, as detailed below. 
Support a multi-donor trust fund on RBF for sanitation 
with a broader set of activities 
A multi-donor trust fund has been set up for the health sec-
tor for achievement of the health-related MDGs, particu-
larly MDGs 1c, 4, and 5, as detailed in Box 6. The Heath 
Results Innovation Trust Fund17 is the main source of fund-
ing for research and analysis on results-based financing in 
the health sector, which gets published on the “Results-
Based Financing for Health” website.18 
The creation of a similar trust fund, specifically designed 
to finance sanitation on an RBF basis, could be envisaged. 
Alternatively, if that was not deemed a priority, financing 
could be channeled to existing trust funds and funding or-
ganizations so that they could support the development of 
sanitation activities on an RBF basis. Existing organizations 
that could potentially benefit from additional funding for 
sanitation RBF include: 
• The Health Results Innovation Trust Fund.19 Pro-
vided they are interested, the remit of the Health 
Results Innovation Trust Fund could be expanded so 
that they would consider sanitation interventions as 
part of a package of health measures.
• The Global Partnership for Output-Based Aid.20 
GPOBA was initially created to pilot OBA mecha-
nisms in a range of sectors, with the potential to al-
locate OBA subsidies as well as technical assistance 
grants. Their focus is now changing and GPOBA is 
set to become a technical assistance body rather than 
providing subsidies, except in some specific sectors 
where ongoing subsidy funding might be required, 
such as water and sanitation. In recent months, 
GPOBA has developed a pipeline of sanitation 
projects that could be funded on an OBA basis and 
where subsidy funding is required. 
• The Global Sanitation Fund (GSF).21 The GSF 
has been set up as part of the Water Supply and 
Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC)22 to in-
crease financing in the sanitation sector. It is open to 
contributions from all sources, and accessible to all 
countries meeting eligibility criteria. The GSF was 
set up as a vertical fund to pool funds from vari-
ous sources to concentrate on a specific set of issues, 
on a model comparable to that of the Global Fund 
Conclusions: 
Moving Toward 
Implementation 
V. KEY POINTS• The success of RBF instruments depends on behavior change also at the sector level.
• A multi-donor trust fund, such as that established for 
other health-related MDGs, could be established for 
expanding the use of RBF for sanitation.
• Strong performance verification methods and empirical 
evidence is needed to support the use of RBF 
instruments for improving sanitation.
17 See www.rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth/content/health-results-innovation-trust-fund
18 See www.rbfhealth.org
19 See www.rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth/content/health-results-innovation-trust-fund
20 Trémolet and Evans 2010
21 See www.wsscc.org/gsf
22 See www.wsscc.org
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the GSF’s management, however, because the GSF 
is hosted within UNOPS, a United Nations agency 
that may have disbursement procedures that do not 
allow RBF. 
Strengthen performance verification mechanisms and 
consider supporting a “partnership” for independent 
performance verification
Independent performance verification is critical to the 
success of RBF schemes and can suffer from weaknesses. 
Technical innovation may be needed to facilitate sanitation 
performance verification (in the same way as the invention 
for Tuberculosis, Aids, and Malaria.23 It was initially 
set up with contributions of approximately US$60 
million, from the Dutch government and several 
other donors. At present, it does not operate on an 
RBF basis although a focus on performance-based 
management and monitoring and evaluation lies at 
the core of its design. In each country of operation, 
the GSF selects an executing agency, which acts as 
the main channel to disburse funds to sub-grantees. 
The GSF could potentially be used as a vehicle for 
RBF to the sector, under a “specific window” with 
dedicated RBF procedures. It would be necessary 
to verify the feasibility of such modus operandi with 
BOX 6: THE HEALTH RESULTS INNOVATION TRUST FUND 
The Health Results Innovation Trust Fund (HRITF) is funded by the Government of Norway and the United King-
dom, with commitments totaling more than US$500 million through 2022. The HRITF finances activities to en-
hance access to and improve the quality of basic health services using a variety of RBF mechanisms. The HRITF 
has four specific aims:
• Support design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of RBF mechanisms;
• Develop and disseminate the evidence base for implementing successful RBF mechanisms;
• Build country institutional capacity to scale up and sustain RBF mechanisms, within the national health 
strategy and system; and
• Attract additional financing to the health sector.
The HRITF works with development partners and client countries to build and use country systems, wherever 
possible. 
The HRITF supports:
• Country Pilot Grants to design, implement, monitor, and evaluate RBF mechanisms, with the following 
countries currently supported: Afghanistan, Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, India, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; 
• Seed grants to assess the value and feasibility of RBF mechanisms in countries; 
• Dissemination and knowledge sharing;
• A global website for knowledge and learning (see www.rbfhealth.org); and 
• An Interagency Working Group (IWG) on RBF, co-chaired by the World Bank, to share knowledge, best 
practices, and lessons learned
The HRITF was initiated in December 2007 and is expected to operate through 2022.
Source: www.rbfhealth.org
23 See www.theglobalfund.org
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of a lumen measurer made it possible to monitor the performance of street light-
ing, for example). Given the development of RBF mechanisms for a number of 
sectors (including health and education but also water and sanitation), it may be 
possible to establish an international partnership (or several at the national level) 
to strengthen performance verification activities, which would provide training 
for performance verification, publish manuals on developing performance verifi-
cation procedures, and include an accreditation system for performance verifica-
tion organizations at the country level. 
Promote the use of sanitation RBF as part of a broader package of inter-
ventions (for example, health and education CCTs to include a sanitation 
component)
Sanitation is often considered in isolation when there are strong linkages with 
other activities, such as providing shelter or carrying out health prevention mea-
sures. Given that most CCT programs routinely include health and education 
indicators, the inclusion of sanitation indicators as part of these broader programs 
could be encouraged. This would require fostering linkages with other sectors and 
communities of practitioners.
Fund solid empirical research through randomized controlled trials to verify 
the impact of RBF instruments vs. more traditional financing methods
The advocates of RBF methods have so far hypothesized that a stronger focus on 
results when using public funds can generate better results for the program as a 
whole, however. There have been a limited number of independent evaluations of 
RBF schemes compared to more traditional financing methods, and all of these 
evaluations have been done for health and education related interventions.24 As 
a result, the relative efficiency of RBF schemes has yet to be demonstrated in the 
sanitation sector and would need to be ascertained through rigorous evaluation. 
This would need to include a comprehensive evaluation of the costs of alternative 
approaches, particularly given that the costs of software interventions tend to be 
under-estimated in the sanitation sector.
Disseminate information and findings about RBF instruments
RBF is now a well-established financing method in the health sector. Information 
on RBF for health is conveniently located in a website managed by the World 
Bank entitled Results-Based Financing for Health.25 Creating an equivalent web-
site on RBF for sanitation (or dedicated webpages on an existing site) could be 
Verification of the impact of RBF 
methods for sanitation would need to 
include a comprehensive evaluation of 
the costs of alternative approaches, 
particularly given that the costs of 
software interventions tend to be 
underestimated in the sanitation sector. 
24 See, for example Basinga et al. (2010) evaluating P4P schemes for health in Rwanda, or Olken, Onishi, and Wong (forthcoming) evaluating the Indonesia’s PNPM Generasi 
program, a CCT program based on health and education indicators in rural Indonesia. In Indonesia, the program’s effectiveness appeared to be considerably higher in health than 
in education, partly because the health interventions take place at regular intervals one month apart rather than every day school attendance for example, which requires a more 
sustained change in behaviour.
25 See www.rbfhealth.org/rbfhealth
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a good way to raise the profile of RBF for sanitation and share experiences once 
these become more numerous. For example, as GPOBA evolves to become a 
“center of excellence” on output-based aid (rather than a direct provider of OBA 
subsidies), a section of its website could support resources dedicated to using 
RBF for sanitation more specifically. In the first instance, and short of creating a 
dedicated website, this could take the form of a “virtual group” or community of 
practice that could disseminate results, share lessons, and learn from each other 
as well as from people who have applied RBF in other sectors or could be incor-
porated as a key topic for the recently launched international Community of 
Practice on sanitation.
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